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MISCELLANEOUS
1. MILITARY DISCHARGE PROCEEDINGS
In Peppers v. United States Army' the Reverend James Pep-
pers sought to have the designation of his 1943 Army discharge
changed to "honorable." Peppers had been discharged pursuant
to the then current Army Regulation 615-360-the infamous
"Section VIII" or "blue" discharge. 2 At his hearing, the Board of
Officers had relied on the testimony of Captain Frankfurth, a
Neuropsychiatric consultant.
In 1946, Peppers, acting pro se, applied to the War Depart-
ment Discharge Review Board to have the terms of his discharge
changed. The gravamen of his complaint was that he had been
told the blue discharge would not interfere with his obtaining a
defense job, a statement which was untrue. 3 Peppers waited
twenty years after the denial of this appeal before making the
same request of the Army Board for Correction of Military Re-
cords.4 That body referred the petitioner to the Army Discharge
Review Board' for a "rehearing" of its 1947 decision. At the subse-
quent hearing, Peppers reiterated his charges that he had been
misinformed about the impact of his "blue" discharge and de-
scribed the discharge hearing as a "mockery" because "there was
no counseling, no person to guide [him] at all . ." The Board,
however, found that Peppers' discharge had been proper. In 1968,
Peppers made his last administrative appeal-again to the Army
Board for Correction of Military Records, which refused to grant
another hearing.
Undaunted, Peppers turned to the District Court of South
Carolina, which accepted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section
1361. 7 There, Judge Hemphill vacated the 1943 discharge and
1. 479 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1973).
2. Peppers' service record at the time of his discharge included several entries for
absence without leave and disorderly conduct.
3. 479 F.2d at 81.
4. This board is established pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1970) which enables the
Secretary of a military department to "correct any military record. . . when he considers
it necessary to correct an error or remove an injustice."
5. 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1970) authorizes the establishment of a board of review "to
review the discharge or dismissal by a sentence of a general court martial of any former
member of an armed force ... "
6. 479 F.2d at 81.
7. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of
mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof
to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
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remanded the case to the Army for further proceedings.' The
court concluded that there was a "blatant violation of due pro-
cess" in the procedure used by the Army in that: (1) Peppers was
ignorant, unable to communicate, and poorly educated; (2) Pep-
pers had no counsel at the hearing; (3) Peppers did not under-
stand the consequences of a "blue" discharge, and it was proba-
ble that he was misled in this respect; (4) there was no evidence
the Army gave Peppers a physical or mental examination before
discharge; and (5) some doubt existed whether Captain Frank-
furth, the psychiatric consultant, was even present at the dis-
charge hearing.9
The court of appeals reversed, relying primarily on a 1961
Fourth Circuit case, Reed v. Franke. '"Reed, a Navy enlisted man,
had attempted to prevent the Navy from issuing him a "general
discharge" pursuant to regulations that provided for no hearing
prior to a general discharge. It was noted, however, that 10 U.S.C.
section 1553" does provide for a mandatory hearing upon request
after the discharge. At such a hearing, all the traditional due
process safeguards, such as the right to counsel and the right to
call witnesses and present rebuttal testimony, are accorded the
defendant. The Reed court also took cognizance of 10 U.S.C.
section 1552,12 which authorizes the Secretary of a military de-
partment to correct military records when he deems it necessary
to "correct an error or remove an injustice."' 3 In holding that this
somewhat inverted procedure meets constitutional requirements,
the court said:
A fact-finding hearing prior to discharge is one way to protect
plaintiff's alleged rights, but it is not the only means of protec-
tion and Congress has provided other ways of preventing injus-
tices and correcting errors in connection with military dis-
charges. By statute, Reed is provided an opportunity to avoid
the injury he claims he will suffer when the discharge becomes
effective.
8. Peppers v. United States Army, Civil No. 71-317 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 1972).
9. Id. at 4.
10. 297 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1961). The court of appeals also noted that the district judge
erred by relying in part on factual claims not made in the previous administrative appeals.
This argument had been the main one presented by the Army in its brief; however, the
court relegated its treatment of this issue to a footnote, indicating that the rationale of
Reed weighed more heavily in its decision.
11. 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1970).
12. 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1970).
13. Id.
[Vol. 26
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The fact that the hearing provided by statute does not pre-
cede, but follows, Reed's separation from the service does not
make the hearing inadequate.'4
With Reed as precedent, the Peppers court logically reasoned
that if due process requirements are met by post-discharge proce-
dures when there is no hearing prior to discharge, then surely due
process was accorded in Peppers' case. He received both a hearing
prior to his discharge and the statutory post-discharge 'procedure,
however inadequate the former might have been. In the view of
the court, the 1947 review, the 1967 hearing, and the 1968 review
cured any possible due process violations of the 1943 discharge.
The analysis used by the court is rational and persuasive if
one accepts the somewhat questionable premise upon which it
rests, viz., the continued validity of the Reed rationale in light of
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In the thirteen years since
Reed was decided, the Court has extended the elements of due
process in a totally unprecedented fashion. Although no Supreme
Court case had dealt squarely with the Reed issue, numerous
cases have treated the problem in analogous situations. For ex-
ample in Goldberg v. Kelly, '1 the Court held that the state of New
York could not terminate welfare payments to a recipient without
affording him an evidentiary hearing prior to termination. The
Court specifically rejected the argument of state officials that an
informal pre-termination review coupled with a post-termination
"fair hearing" satisfied due process requirements.' 6 Bell v.
Burson'7 extended this principle even further by holding that be-
fore a state can suspend the driver's license of an uninsured mo-
torist involved in an accident, it must afford the driver procedural
due process. The Court said:
lilt is fundamental that except in emergency situations .
due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an
interest such as that here involved, it must afford "notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case"
before the termination becomes effective.' 8
Of course, there are many other instances in which the court has
not been hesitant to extend the umbrella of procedural due pro-
14. 297 F.2d at 27.
15. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
16. Id. at 266.
17. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
18. Id. at 542 (emphasis supplied by the court).
1974]
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cess.'5 Goldberg and Bell must be recognized as representing but
a small portion of the virtual "procedural revolution" that has
occurred since 1961, when Reed was decided.
It is well documented that the deprivations ensuing from a
discharge, such as the one Peppers received, are of no little conse-
quence. In addition to losing his rights to veteran's benefits, Pep-
pers was, in effect, sentenced to what courts have recognized as
"a life long disability. . . very akin to the concept of infamy. 20
Other courts have stated that a discharge on other than honorable
grounds "is in life, if not in law, prima facie evidence against the
serviceman's character, patriotism, or loyality. ' '2' Perhaps most
importantly, it results in a "social stigma which greatly limits the
opportunities for both public and private civilian employment.
22
In several recent cases,23 the Court has had occasion to dis-
cuss exactly what interests are within the scope of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment..24 The language used in some
of these cases is remarkably similar to language used by courts
to describe the consequences of a dishonorable discharge. For
example, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,25 the Court said:
19. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), indicating due process requirements
also attach to replevin actions; Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), holding
violative of due process the posting of names of persons unable to buy liquor without
affording such persons notice and an opportunity to be heard; Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), declaring that the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment proce-
dure did not afford procedural due process; cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972).
20. Evertt, Military Administrative Discharges-The Pendulum Swings, 1966 DuKE
L.J. 41, 50 (1966); cited in Kaufman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 995 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
21. Stapp v. Resor, 314 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See, e.g., Bland v. Con-
nally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
22. Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (footnote omitted). See also
119 CONG. REC. 20161 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1973) (remarks of Senator Ervin):
[L]etters from discharged servicemen unable to find jobs, from those who
cannot get the job they desire, and from those who wanted a military career but
were returned to the civilian world with little marketable experience continue
to reach the [Constitutional Rights] subcommittee. Their common complaint
is that the administrative discharge system has unfairly condemned them to an
inferior condition-whether it be in terms of a job or simply the respect of their
family and friends ....
23. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
24. The fourteenth amendment is, by its terms, applicable only to the states. How-
ever, the fifth amendment due process clause, applicable to the federal government would,
presumably, include essentially the same protected interests.
25. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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[C]ertainly where the State attaches a "badge of infamy" to
the citizen, due process comes into play ....
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity
is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,
notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential.26
Again, in Board of Regents v. Roth,2 the Court undertook to
define some of the "liberties" guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment. Stating that the term embraces more than the free-
dom from bodily restraint, the Court included in its definition
"the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life . . .and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.
'28
Thus, it appears that in Peppers the court of appeals was
presented with an opportunity to repudiate the Reed rationale
and extend the due process requirement of an adequate pre-
termination hearing to an area arguably as important as some of
the areas dealt with by the Supreme Court in recent years. Per-
haps one reason the court failed to take this step is pragmatic.
Allowing Peppers' appeal would open the court to an influx of
similar petitions, 29 many of which would (like Peppers') have to
be decided on the basis of inadequate or lost military records.
In partial response to the Peppers problem, several bills deal-
ing with military discharges have been introduced in Congress.
One would eliminate all designations from military discharge
certificates .3 This bill also provides for a retroactive effect; serv-
26. Id. at 437.
27. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
28. Id. at 572, quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1922).
29. The court's possible fear of being overburdened by petitions similar to Peppers'
may be unjustified in that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims was expanded in August,
1972 by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491 (1973):
To provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by the judg-
ment, the court may, as an incident of and collateral to any such judgment,
issue orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate
duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records, and such orders
may be issued to any appropriate official of the United States.
See also Parrish v. Seamans, 485 F.2d 572 (4th Cir. 1973), where the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, noting this expansion of jurisdiction, affirmed the district court's
holding that Parrish should have sought relief in the Court of Claims. Parrish, a former
Air Force officer, had sought to have his court martial set aside on the grounds that
depositions had been used in lieu of witnesses. He had also asked for a writ of mandamus
pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), to compel the Secretary of the Air Force to restore
the rank, pay and allowances he had forfeited.
30. S. 1716, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
1974]
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icemen discharged prior to its enactment may, upon proper appli-
cation, receive a new discharge certificate bearing no designation.
A second bill,' introduced by Senator Ervin, would completely
overhaul the current structure for awarding military discharges,
incorporating essentially all of the traditional due process re-
quirements into military administrative discharges.
3 2
I. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
The dangers inherent in attorneys' advancing money to their
clients and the complications that can follow from such a practice
were forcefully illustrated by In re Sandifer.3 The respondent had
agreed to represent his client, Roland, in a personal injury action
arising from a Washington, D.C., train accident. When the con-
tingent fee contract was agreed upon, Roland was hospitalized
and unable to work. In addition, his wife was disabled, and there
were small children in the family. According to Roland's own
testimony, he was "desperately in need of both money and a
lawyer to represent him.
'34
Beginning with a $150 loan on the date of employment, 15
there followed "extensive and involved" loan transactions be-
tween Sandifer and Roland, ultimately totaling $4,544.47. A
Washington, D.C., attorney was associated to assist in the case,
and a settlement of $16,000 was finally agreed upon. After attor-
neys' fees and an amount owed to the Lexington State Bank were
deducted, there remained only $3,029.50 of the original $16,000.
This amount was applied to "notes from Roland to Sandifer, for
food and clothes, living essentials . . . . ,,3" This, of course, left
Roland still owing respondent Sandifer the sum of $1,514.97, a
31. S. 2684, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
32. Current Army regulations provide for courts martial for discharges designated as
"dishonorable" or "bad conduct" discharges. The remaining three types of discharges,
generally designated as "administrative discharges" ("undesirable," "general," and "hon-
orable") "may or may not have been directed by an administrative board." Ervin,
Military Administrative Discharges: Due Process in the Doldrums, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
9, 11 (1972). The Ervin bill is aimed primarily at the so called "administrative" dis-
charges.
33. 260 S.C. 633, 198 S.E.2d 120 (1973).
34. Id. at 635, 198 S.E.2d at 121.
35. The court noted that this fact, standing alone, might be an indication of solicita-
tion; however, it accepted the finding of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline that the evidence was "clearly to the effect . that there was in fact no
solicitation." Id. at 638, 198 S.E.2d at 123.
36. Id. at 637, 198 S.E.2d at 122.
37. There was a conflict in the evidence concerning what transpired when the settle-
[Vol. 26
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most undesirable situation from the point of view of both the
attorney and his client.
In ordering a public reprimand as the appropriate punish-
ment, the court was cognizant of the fact that Sandifer was not
acting out of selfish or otherwise reprehensible motives:
While initially humane consideration for the desperate needs of
Roland and his wife, rather than any selfish end of the respon-
dent, appears to have led to the loans, the end result was a
situation where obviously the attorney had, even by his testi-
mony, lost control of the litigation.-"
Beclouding what appears to be the main issue in the case is
the additional factor that the memorandum given by the respon-
dent to Roland at the time of the settlement was found to be an
inadequate accounting of the settlement distribution. From the
facts given in the opinion, it is difficult to ascertain all the ele-
ments that made the accounting unsatisfactory. The opinion re-
veals that the memorandum was handwritten but accompanied
by photocopies of the various checks and notes representing the
sums advanced. The court did point out an error in the memoran-
dum; one $500 note listed as due the respondent had actually
been incorporated into an indebtedness due the bank. Stating
that this error emphasized "the inadequacy of his accounting,
'39
the court concluded that the respondent failed "to give a com-
plete and intelligible statement of account to his client ....
The court was careful to point out that it considered both
offenses in finding Sandifer guilty of professional misconduct:
[The] loan transactions of the respondent with his client
coupled with his failure to give a complete and intelligible state-
ment of account . . . tended to pollute the administration of
justice and bring the legal profession into disrepute ....
• . . When faced with this situation, it was more incumbent
than ever upon the respondent to furnish the client a detailed
and intelligible statement .... 1
ment was agreed upon. Roland testified that he was told he would receive at least some
money from the settlement; Sandifer maintained he told his client he would, in fact, still
be in debt. Id. at 638, 198 S.E.2d at 122.
38. Id. at 638, 198 S.E.2d at 123.
39. Id. at 637, 198 S.E.2d at 122.
40. Id. at 638, 198 S.E.2d at 122.
41. Id. at 638, 198 S.E.2d at 122-23 (emphasis added). The court also noted that in
nearly all disciplinary proceedings of this nature, the loan has been "only one factor
accompanied by other misconduct, such as improper solicitation of legal business." Id. at
639, 198 S.E.2d at 123.
1974]
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This language leaves unanswered the perplexing question of
whether the result would have been the same had the advance-
ment of funds been the sole instance of questionable conduct.
Despite several provisions in the Canons of Professional Ethics
4 2
(which are somewhat obscure on this issue), and an American Bar
Association Opinion13 (which is more specific in prohibiting loans
to clients), courts in some jurisdictions have indicated that the
advancement of living expenses is not improper, at least when no
solicitation is involved.4 The South Carolina Supreme Court has
not made a definitive statement on this matter, but arguably its
position is clear. On January 29, 1973, the supreme court took the
desirable step of adopting the Code of Professional Responsibility
promulgated by the American Bar Association.15 The Code su-
persedes the somewhat vague and outmoded Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics which have previously been the controlling stan-
dards of professional responsibility in South Carolina. Consisting
of Canons, Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules, the
Code is much more explicit and detailed than were the Canons
in delineating the exact ethical standards expected of attorneys.
With respect to the Sandifer situation, the Code provides:
While representing a client in connection with contemplated or
pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee fin-
ancial assistance to his client, except that a lawyer may advance
or guarantee the expenses of litigation . . medical examina-
tion, and . . . obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the
client remains ultimately liable for such expenses."
When this precise wording is compared with the more general
language of the Canons,' which governed when the infractions
42. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 10, "The lawyer should not purchase
any interest in the subject matter of the litigation he is conducting"; No. 42, "A lawyer
may not properly agree with a client that the lawyer shall pay or bear the expenses of
litigation; he may in good faith advance expenses as a matter of convenience, but subject
to reimbursement." See also Canon 6 (conflicting interests) and Canon 27 (advertising).
43. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 288 (1954).
44. See Hildebrand v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 2d 816, 117 P.2d 860 (1941); State ex rel.
Florida Bar v. Dawson, 111 S.2d 427 (Fla. 1959); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
McCallum, 341 Il. 578, 173 N.E. 827 (1930); Johnson v. Great N. Ry., 128 Minn. 365, 151
N.W. 125 (1915); In re Sizer, 306 Mo. 356, 267 S.W. 922 (1924); Mytton v. Missouri Pacific
R.R., 208 Mo. App. 361, 221 S.W. 111 (1919).
45. Order of South Carolina Supreme Court, Re: Rules of Practice, Rule 32, Jan. 29,
1973.
46. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE sPoNssLrrv DR 5-103(B). For the Code provision
dealing with the rendering of accounts to clients, see DR 9-102(B)(3).
47. See CANONS cited note 40 supra.
[Vol. 26278
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occurred in Sandifer, it can readily be seen that the Code will give
clearer guidance to attorneys.
In another disciplinary action, In re Julian,41 the court re-
fused to accept the penalty recommended by the Board of Com-
missioners on Grievances and Discipline. Of the six charges
lodged against the respondent, he was found guilty of four: (1)
wrongfully withholding from a client the sum of $100.00 in the
disbursement of funds from the settlement of a tort. claim; (2)
wrongfully refusing to return a client's file; (3) dividing fees with
an individual who was not an attorney; and (4) filing suit against
a hospital to collect a fee based upon a "totally ridiculous, ab-
surd, and preposterous" bill for services.49 Although the Board
had recommended a public reprimand, the court felt the offenses
merited the stronger sanction of indefinite suspension.
III. ELECTION PROCEDURES
South Carolina's beleaguered election laws once again came
under attack in Toporek v. South Carolina State Election
Commission.'" The controversy in Toporek centered around the
South Carolina Legislature's attempt to deal with the decision of
an earlier case, United Citizens Party v. South Carolina State
Election Commission.5" This 1970 case had invalidated Code sec-
tion 23-264, which provided:
[Afny political party nominating candidates for the general
election by party convention shall nominate the party candidate
and make the nominations public not later than the date and
time fixed for the closing of primary entries.
52
Observing that it is black letter law that "a legislature may not
delegate legislative functions to private persons or associations,"53
the three judge district court held that the statute was "an uncon-
stitutional delegation of power . . . to the established private
political parties of South Carolina to fix the specific deadline by
which the candidates must be nominated and announced." 54
48. 260 S.C. 48, 194 S.E.2d 195 (1973).
49. Id. at 49, 194 S.E.2d at 196.
50. 362 F. Supp. 613 (D.S.C. 1973).
51. 319 F. Supp. 784 (D.S.C. 1970).
52. No. 995, [1968] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2316.
53. 319 F. Supp. at 787.
54. Id. at 786.
1974] 279
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In June 1972, the legislature amended section 23-26455 to pro-
vide that parties nominating by party convention must make
their nominations public "not later than the time for closing the
polls on the date of the primary election."56 A similar deadline
was set for candidates nominated by petition. 57 In Toporek, the
plaintiffs challenging this new provision had sought to have the
names of various potential candidates placed on the general elec-
tion ballot by both the petition and party convention methods.
8
Upon being notified that their certificates were not timely filed,
the candidates brought suit in federal court. The defendants as-
serted that the 1972 legislation corrected the objectionable fea-
ture of the former version 23-264 by establishing the announce-
ment deadline for non-primary candidates as the date of the pri-
mary election, rather than the closing date for the filing of pri-
mary entries. Thus, it was argued, since the date of the primary
election is set by statute,59 there was no unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative authority involved.
In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the statute
purporting to set the date for primary election merely provided
that in the event a party nominates candidates by party primary
election, the election is to be held the second Tuesday in June.60
Thus, the act, as written, does not explicitly set the second Tues-
day in June as the announcement date. In the unlikely event that
no party should hold a primary in a given year, presumably the
June filing date would be nugatory and the only filing require-
ment remaining would be section 23-400.15, which requires certi-
fication to the Election Commission thirty-five days before the
general election.' This fact, reasoned the court, engendered the
same type of equal protection problem found in the United Citi-
zens Party case since "it is clear that the sine qua non of the
plaintiffs' failure to meet the statutory time limit . . . was the
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-264 (Cune. Supp. 1973) (No. 1354, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt.
Res. 2,531).
56. Id.
57. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.16 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (No. 1354, [1972] S.C. Acts &
Jt. Res. 2531).
58. Plaintiff Toporek was a petition candidate for the State Senate in senatorial
district 16. Plaintiff John R. Harper represented nominees of the United Citizens Party
who had been designated by party convention to run for senate seats in senatorial district
11 and for positions on the Allendale County Board of Commissioners. 362 F. Supp. at
615.
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-396 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
60. Id.
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.15 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
[Vol. 26
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Democratic Party's decision not to break with precedent and to
hold a primary. ... 62 Accordingly, the court was compelled to
hold, "hopefully for the last time, 6 3 that the time limitations of
section 23-264 were unconstitutional as applied to non-primary
candidates.
The court found an alternative, and perhaps more cogent,
reason for invalidating the existing announcement date provi-
sions, at least as applied to petition candidates. Section 23-266
of the Code provides that:
If a Party nominee dies, withdraws, or otherwise becomes dis-
qualified after his nomination, and sufficient time does not re-
main to hold a convention or a primary ... , the respective
State or county party executive committee may nominate a
nominee for such office . . 6
This section was found to give an unfair advantage to organized
political parties. It allows them to nominate a "ghost candidate"
prior to the June deadline and later substitute a bona fide candi-
date, whereas petition candidates may get on the general election
ballot only by certifying prior to the June deadline, a full five
months in advance. 5 The court found "no valid interest, rational
or compelling"" in such an arrangement.
Still another constitutional infirmity was found in the treat-
ment of candidates who are unsuccessful in primary elections.67
Section 23-400.16 provides that defeated candidates are pre-
cluded from being placed on the ballot in the subsequent general
election "by petition or otherwise."68 However, as the court
pointed out, there is no regulation to prevent a candidate who is
defeated in a convention from later offering as a petition c~ndi-
62. 362 F. Supp. at 619, quoting from United Citizens Party v. South Carolina State
Election Comm'n, 319 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.S.C. 1970).
63. 362 F. Supp. at 619.
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-266 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (emphasis added).
65. The court also noted an incongruity between section 23-266 and section 23-400.15
of the election laws. The former provision provides that substituted nominees must be
certified no later than thirty days prior to the general election, while section 23-400.15
mandates that all candidates be certified at least thirty-five days before the general
election. 362 F. Supp. at 620 n.1.
66. 362 F. Supp. at 620.
67. Torporek had been an unsuccessful candidate in the Charleston Democratic Pri-
mary (for the State House of Representatives) and was attempting to have his name
placed on the general election ballot as a candidate for the State Senate via the petition
route. The Chairmen of the State and Charleston County Democratic parties intervened
pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.72 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-400.16 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
1974]
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date or participating in a primary election. The court saw such
"irrational treating of like things differently"69 as a denial of
equal protection to primary candidates. Therefore, the court also
invalidated this provision of the election laws of South Carolina.
This latter section, in contrast with section 23-264, does ap-
pear to have had at least a slight degree of legitimacy. Arguably,
candidates who are defeated in a primary election or at a conven-
tion and who later offer for the same position in the subsequent
general election might tend to confuse voters and undermine the
integrity of the election process. It is thus possible that the legis-
lature might once again attempt to place this restriction on can-
didates. Section 23-400.16 could presumably be resurrected by
broadening its scope to include candidates who are defeated in a
convention contest.
70
IV. SEX DISCRIMINATION
In Eslinger v. Thomas,7' a female law student at the Univer-
sity of South Carolina brought a class action suit, alleging that
she had been denied employment as a page in the South Carolina
Senate solely because of her sex. Several months after initiation
of the suit, the South Carolina Senate adopted a resolution 72 simi-
lar to one promulgated by the United States Senate, 73 allowing
females to be employed as "clerical assistants" or "committee
attendants." The resolution would thus allow females to perform
most duties of regular senate pages, except certain personal er-
rands for senators. Eslinger also attacked this resolution as being
violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, because it still allowed only males to serve as full "senate
pages."
69. 362 F. Supp. at 618.
70. Even then, the legislation might be subject to judicial invalidation. Redfearn v.
Board of State Canvassers, 234 S.C. 113, 107 S.E.2d 10 (1959) held that a pledge taken
by a primary candidate to "abide by the results of said primary and to support in the next
general election all candidates nominated in said primary" imposed a moral, and not a
legal, obligation on a candidate. The court also indicated that Article 1, Section 10 of the
South Carolina Constitution sets the maximum restrictions that can be placed on candi-
dates for elective office. Id. at 115-16, 107 S.E.2d at 11. In Redfearn, the court did not
have to deal squarely with the predecessor of § 23-400.16, since the recalcitrant candidate
there waged a wr'ite-in campaign and the statutory provision presumably applies only to
candidates attempting to have their names printed on the ballot.
71. 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973).
72. S.C. Senate Res. 525 (1971).
73. S. Res. 112, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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Eslinger urged the district court74 to designate sex as a "sus-
pect category" and thereby force the defendants to justify their
actions on the basis of some "compelling state objective."75 She
urged this test in lieu of the more traditional equal protection test
which requires only the showing of a "rational basis""6 for treating
groups of individuals differently. The court refused to abandon
the traditional test, stating that the more stringent test was
applicable only in a very limited number of areas, primarily those
involving racial classification and classifications which restrict
the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.7 7 The court fur-
ther found that, while Eslinger had in fact been denied employ-
ment "solvely because of her sex," no effective relief could be
granted. The Lieutenant Governor and the President Pro Tem-
pore of the Senate were held to be immune from suit under the
"speech or debate" clause of the United States Constitution. 78
Although the Clerk of the Senate, was not immune from suit, he
nevertheless was not subject to monetary damages because he
had been acting in good faith.7" In addition, the superseding reso-
lution was not found to violate the constitutional right of female
citizens ."
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed" and
held that the plaintiff and the class she represented were entitled
to equitable relief. On appeal, Eslinger had renewed her sugges-
tion that sex be designed a "suspect category." The court, how-
ever adopted an intermediate approach:
A classification based on sex is less than suspect; a validating
relationship must be more than minimal. What emerges is an
"intermediate approach" between rational basis and compelling
interest as a test of validity under the equal protection clause.,,
The court derived its new test from the recent United States
Supreme Court case of Reed v. Reed,8 3 which invalidated an
Idaho practice of giving preference to males over females when
both qualify equally for appointment as administrator of a dece-
74. Eslinger v. Thomas, 340 F. Supp. 886 (D.S.C. 1972).
75. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
76. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
77. 340 F. Supp. at 896.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
79. 340 F. Supp. at 895.
80. Id. at 896-97.
81. 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973).
82. Id. at 231 (footnote omitted).
83. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
1974]
13
Anderson: Miscellaneous
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
dent's estate. Reed was interpreted as indicating there must be a
"fair and substantial" relation between the basis of the classifica-
tion and the category being classified.84 In Eslinger, the basis of
the classification, avoiding the "appearance of impropriety" that
would result from female pages performing all the tasks that regu-
lar pages perform,5 did not meet the "fair and substantial" test
that the court perceived formulated by the Supreme Court.
Less than two months after the 'court of appeals decided
Eslinger, the United States Supreme Court, in Frontiero v.
Richardson,"5 again dealt with the subject of sex discrimination.
This time a plurality of the court held that sex was indeed a
suspect category. 7 Justice Brennan, speaking for the four-man
plurality, stated that he found "at least implicit support for such
an approach in the decision last term in Reed v. Reed.""5 Most
lower courts 9 that had considered the question subsequent to the
Reed decision had not found any support, implicit or otherwise,
for construing sex to be a suspect category. The Frontiero deci-
sion, however, probably should be taken as indicating that hence-
forth sex may join other "inherently suspect" classifications such
as those based upon race, alienage, or national origin." While
84. 476 F.2d at 230-31.
85. Eg., running personal errands for senators, driving senators about in their autos,
packing their bags in hotel rooms, and cashing personal checks. 476 F.2d at 231.
86. - U.S. -, 93 S.Ct. 1764 (1973).
87. "We can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications
based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore
by subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 1771.
88. Id. at 1768. Joining in Brennan's opinion were Justices Douglas, White and
Marshall, Justices Powell and Blackmun, along with Chief Justice Burger, concurred in
the result; however, they would not go so far as to make classification based on sex
"inherently suspect." Justice Rehnquist dissented, based on the reasons stated in the
lower court opinion. This left Justice Stewart as the crucial "swing man." In his enigmatic
one sentence concurrence, he merely stated that "the statutes ...work an invidious
discrimination in violation of the Constitution. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71" Id. at 1772-
73.
89. E.g., Green v. Waterford Bd. Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2nd Cir. 1973); Wark v. Rob-
bins, 458 F.2d 1295 (1st Cir. 1972). However, even some pre-Reed cases found sex to be a
suspect category. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D.
Conn. 1968); Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 95 Cal Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529 (1971).
90. In a recent case, Cleveland Bd. Educ. v. LaFleur, - U.S. _ 94 S.Ct. 791
(1974), the Court was once again urged to designate sex as a suspect category. La Fleur
was a case challenging the constitutionality of mandatory maternity leaves for public
school teachers. The Court held such a practice to be unconstitutional. However, it based
its decision on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and chose to ignore
the more perplexing question of exactly where classifications based on sex belong on the
equal protection spectrum.
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such an approach would not have affected the outcome in
Eslinger, certainly it would be of consequence in deciding close
cases.
V. TAXATION
Bob Jones University v. Connally9' ostensibly involves the
construction of section 7421 of the Internal Revenue Code which
provides "[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment
or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court ....
The overall ramifications of the case, however, are far broader
than the rather innocent sounding words of section 7421 seem to
suggest.
In July of 1970, the Internal Revenue Service announced that
private schools with racially discriminatory policies would be
denied tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3). 3 In addition,
individual contributions to such schools would not be deductible
on the contributor's tax return, as provided for in section 170(c).Y
Bob Jones University is a fundamentalist religious institu-
tion which lists among its tenents the belief that "God intended
the various races of men to live separate and apart.0 95 Accord-
ingly, the University does not admit Black students, a fact which
prompted various communications and meetings between the
Internal Revenue Service and the University subsequent to the
1970 pronouncement.
These administrative negotiations were broken off in Sep-
tember of 1971 when the University brought suit in the federal
district court, seeking to restrain the Service from revoking its
tax-exempt status. 6 The district court concluded that the anti-
injunction statute, section 7421, was not a bar, since technically,
this was not an action to enjoin the "assessment or collection" of
a tax. 7 Furthermore, the court reasoned, the underlying purpose
of the threatened revocation was
[T]o compel, through the use or threat to use, [of] taxing
powers . . . private educational and religious institutions to
91. 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1973), rehearing denied 476 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
granted, U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 116 (1973).
92. INT. REV. CODF OF 1954, § 7421.
93. Id. § 501(c)(3).
94. Id. § 170(c)(4).
95. 472 F.2d at 904.
96. 341 F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1971).
97. Id. at 282.
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comply with certain political or social guidelines with regard to
the question of racial integration.98
Accordingly, the court issued an injunction pendente lite.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed
the complaint, stating that the anti-injunction act was applica-
ble."0 The court reasoned that a revocation of Bob Jones's tax
exempt status would have the twofold effect of making the Uni-
versity taxable on any net income that accrued to it and making
contributions from individuals non-deductible. Since either of
these would result in an increase in tax revenues, the court con-
cluded that an "assessment or collection" was, in fact, involved.
Having concluded that section 7421 does operate in this area,
the court then analyzed the court-made exception to the statu-
tory command. The 1962 Supreme Court case of Enochs v. Wil-
liams Packing Co. "" sets up two requirements which must be met
before the taxpayer can avoid the statutory roadblock. He must
show that: (1) irreparable injury will result if collection is ef-
fected, and (2) "under no circumstances could the Government
ultimately prevail.""
The court of appeals conceded that the first requirement laid
down in Williams Packing was met. If the University were to have
its tax exempt status terminated, one result would surely be a
sharp decline in the number of individual contributions. Even if
the University were to later win in a trial on the-merits and have
its privileged status restored, there would be no way to recoup the
donations lost in the interim. However, with regard to the second
test, the court felt that it was unable to say that "under no cir-
cumstances" would the government be successful in its revoca-
tion proceeding. The court pointed to Green v. Connally,112 a case
involving private schools in Mississippi. After an analysis of the
Green opinion, the court concluded:
In light of the Fourteenth Amendment, the decisions of the Su-
preme Court on the subject of school desegregation and the Civil
98. Id. at 284.
99. 472 F.2d 903 (4th Cir. 1973).
100. 370 U.S. 1 (1962).
101. Id. at 7.
102. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971). Green involved a class action by Blacks whose children attended public
schools in Mississippi. They were successful in enjoining the Treasury Department from
according tax exempt status and deductibility of contributions to private schools practic-
ing racial discrimination.
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Rights Act of 1964, the exemptions and deductions provided for
charitable educational institutions are not available for private
schools discriminating on the grounds of race."03
Thus, section 7421 was a complete bar to the suit by Bob Jones
University, because the second test of William Packing was not
met. In addition, the court dismissed the issue that was seen as
controlling by the district court. The contention of Bob Jones that
the actual purpose for the threatened revocation was not to col-
lect taxes but to exact compliance with political or social guide-
lines was said to be "irrelevant to the proper disposition of
[the]case."'' ,
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Bob Jones
case,'0 5 together with a District of Columbia case, Americans
United v. Walters.'06 Americans United involves the revocation of
exempt status for lobbying activities. However, the holding there
appears to be somewhat inconsistent with Bob Jones, since the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the taxpayer
there was not barred by section 7421. Hopefully, the Supreme
Court opinions in these two cases will clarify some of the conflict
and confusion in this area. In view of the Court's per curiam
affirmance of the Green opinion,10 an upholding of the court of
appeals decision in Bob Jones would appear to be likely.*
JOSEPH F. ANDERSON, JR.
103. 472 F.2d at 907.
104. Id.
105. U.S. ,94 S.Ct. 116 (1973).
106. 477 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, U.S. , 93 S.Ct. 2752 (1973).
107. 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
* [Editor's Note: After this issue had gone to press, the Supreme Court handed down
decisions in both the Bob Jones and Americans United cases. In Bob Jones, the Court
affirmed the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals using essentially the same
rationale as the lower court. Bob Jones University v. Simon, -U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2038
(1974). In the companion case, Americans United, the Court reversed, saying that to allow
injunctive relief on the facts presented "would render § 7421(a) quite meaningless." Alex-
ander v. "Americans United" Inc., - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 2053, 2059 (1974).]
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